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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HAL E. HOLMSTEAD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC. 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12257 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries 
caused by the negligence of defendant's agent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied defndant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. Thereafter, this Court granted de-
fendant's Petition for Intermediate Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a determination that a covenant not 
to sue executed in favor of defendant's agent does not 
release defendant. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's statement of facts 
except for ( 1) defendant's statement of plaintiff's theory 
of liability and ( 2) defendant's conspicuous omission of 
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the co\·-
enant not to sue defendant's agent, Gideon Allen. 
Defendant states that, "Plaintiff ... seeks to hold 
defendant liable under the doctrine of master and ser-
vant or respondent superior. No independant [sic] or 
active negligence is alleged on the part of" defendant. 
As plaintiff's argument below will more fully support, 
it is his position that since defendant, a corporation, 
can act only through its agents, the liability of de-
fendant is not dependent or derivative but primary. 
Defendant's silence concerning the circumstances 
surrounding execution of the covenant not to sue, on the 
effect of which the outcome of this appeal rests, is dis-
ingenuous at best. Since this is an intermediate appeal, 
there are no facts of record relating to the execution 
of the covenant beyond the mere fact of its execution. 
However, in the record of Holmstead vs. Allen, Civil 
No. 34120, which has been included in this record, the 
court found that the covenant was entered into with 
the consent and approval of defendant's counsel, that 
he, as well as plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff, defendant's 
agent and the latter's insurer all understood and in-
tended that the covenant was to contain an express 
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reservation of rights against plaintiff. The record in 
that case further shows that the omission of such a 
reservation was inadvertant and resulted from a mutual 
mistake of the parties to the covenant. Defendant's 
subsequent assertion of the covenant as a defense is an 
attempt to take belated advantage of that mistake con-
trary to an understanding among counsel as to the pur-
pose and effect of the covenant. 
The facts which defendant will show at the trial 
(and did show in the case of Holmstead v. Allen, are 
these: During the first several months of 1969, counsel 
for the plaintiff engaged in a series of negotiations in 
an effort to settle plaintiff's claim short of litigation. 
The insurance carrier for defendant's agent, Gideon 
Allen, indicated a willingness to settle for the limits of 
Allen's coverage. Negotiations with defendant's counsel 
and insurance carrier were, however, unsuccessful. 
On April 16, 1969, counsel for plaintiff wrote to 
Fred Smith, casualty adjuster for Gideon Allen's insur-
ance company, to confirm an earlier telephone conver-
sation agreeing to settle for the limits of Allen's cover-
age. The letter stated: 
"In this regard, it would be our intent to reserve 
our right against Abbott G. M. Diesel and to 
give a covenant not to sue or execute against 
your insured." 
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Plaintiff filed the present action on April 1 7, 1969. 
Counsel for defendant requested time to file his answer 
while he attempted to negotiate a settlement involvino 
,..., 
the insurance carriers for both defendant and defend-
ant's agent. He was unsuccessful in this effort and so 
informed plaintiff. 
During the period between the filing of this action 
on April 17, 1969, and the filing of defendant's answer 
on July 12, 1969, counsel for the parties to this action 
had several conversations in the course of which Harold 
G. Christensen, counsel for defendant, recommended, 
in view of his failure to obtain a settlement, that plain-
tiff settle separately with Allen and his insurance carrier. 
(See exhibits, etc., in Holmstead v. Allen.) It was 
understood by both parties to these discussions with 
defendant's counsel that such settlement would reserve 
plaintiff's rights against defendant by means of an express 
reservation in the covenant not to sue. 
On July 7, 1969, plaintiff executed a covenant not 
to sue in favor of Gideon Allen. As evidenced by the 
letter of April 16, 1969, from plaintiff's counsel to Allen's 
carrier and pursuant to the understanding reached orally 
between counsel for plaintiff and defendant, such cov-
enant was intended by the parties thereto to contain an 
express reservation of plaintiff's rights against defend-
ant. However, through a mutual mistake of fact result-
ing from a clerical error the reservation was omitted 
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from the covenant not to sue. Mr. Mel Clement the 
' 
adjuster handling the final settlement for Allen's carrier, 
confirmed the plaintiff's version of the facts surrounding 
the execution of the covenant. (See letter of December 
8, 1969, from Mel Clement, Exhibit 2 in Holmstead v. 
Allen.) 
When it later became apparent that counsel for 
defendant, contrary to the understanding previously ar-
rived at, intended to plead the covenant not to sue in its 
own defense, plaintiff brought a separate action against 
Gideon Allen and his insurer to have the covenant not 
to sue reformed to include a reservation of rights against 
defendant in conformity with the true intent of the 
parties. The merits of the action to reform being well 
known to all concerned, Gideon Allen and his insurer 
made no attempt to defend and a decree of reformation 
was intered on default, the effect of which was to in-
clude in the covenant a reservation of plaintiff's rights 
against defendant. 
In its brief on appeal, defendant argues that the 
decree of reformation is not binding upon it because it 
was not made a party to that action. Although plaintiff 
regards this contention as wholly without merit, he has 
filed a subsequent action for reformation of the coven-
ant naming as defendants therein the present defendant 
and its insurer. It is interesting that defendant resisted 
vigorously, and successfully, a motion to stay this appeal 
until a decision is reached in the second action for re-
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formation of the covenant, which if heard would make 
this point on appeal moot. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY TO 
THE ACTION TO REFORM THE COVENANT NOT TO 
SUE. 
The defendant contends that the decree of refor-
mation, which amended the covenant not to sue by 
reserving plaintiff's rights against defendant, is not 
binding on defendant because defendant was not made 
a party to the action for reformation. 
The conditions upon which a person is deemed to 
have a sufficient interest in the subject matter or out-
come of litigation to require that he be made a party 
thereto are stated in Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Por-
cedure, as follows: 
" ... [P]ersons having a joint interest shall be 
made parties and be joined on the same side as 
plaintiffs or defendants." 
The rule is, of course, identical with the former 
Federal Rule 19, concerning which it was held that 
the purpose of the rule was to adopt the former equity 
rule that all persons materially interested, either legally 
or beneficially, in the subject matter of the suit, be made 
parties to it. United States v. Petrosky, 2 F.R.D. 422 
(W.D. Mich. 1942) 
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The question thus becomes one initially of the 
nature of defendant's alleged interest in the covenant 
not to sue and secondly of whether such an interest is 
sufficiently material to require that defendant be made 
a party to the action for reformation. 
It is apparent that if defendant has any interest at 
all in the covenant it is as some sort of third party bene-
ficiary since defendant is not an immediate party there-
to and gave no consideration therefor. It is hornbook 
law that if such a third party beneficiary is either a 
"creditor" or a "donee" beneficiary of the contract, 
that is, one for whose benefit the contract was intended, 
he may sue upon the contract to enforce his rights 
thereunder. 
"As a general proposition, the determining 
factor as to the rights of a third-party beneficiary 
is the intention of the parties who actually made 
the contract. The real test is said to be whether 
the contracting parties intended that a third per-
son should receive a benefit which might be en-
forced in the courts." 17 Am. fur. 2d 727, Con-
tracts § 304 ( 1964) . 
On the other hand, the principle "is not so far extended 
as to give to a third person who is only indirectly and 
incidentally benefited by the contract the right to sue 
upon it." Ibid., § 307. 
The leading Utah case of Kelly v. Richards, 9J 
Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938), is in accord with the 
foregoing. There it was held that an agreement be-
tween stockholders of an automobile dealer and an 
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automobile manufacturer, whereby the stockholders were 
to advance certain sums to the dealer and the manu-
facturer was to grant a distributorship to the dealer, 
was intended for the benefit of the parties and not the 
dealer and that the receiver of the dealer corporation 
had no enforceable interest in the agreement even though 
it would have yielded a substantial benefit to the dealer. 
" ... [A]n incidental beneficiary has no rights 
under the contract. . . . [BJ efore a third party 
can sue for a breach of a contract to which he 
was not a party he must show that the contract 
was intended to benefit him directly. . .. " 83 
P.2d 736. 
A more recent case refusing to enforce the interest 
of an incidental third-party beneficiary is Mason v. 
Tooele City, 484 P.2d 153(1971); cf. Schwinghammer 
v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968). 
From these authorities it is clear that Rule 19 does 
not require joinder of an incidental beneficiary in an 
action between the parties to the contract to terminate 
or modify their rights and obligations. 
"In general, a third party does not become 
indispensable to an action to terminate a con-
tract simply because its rights or obligations under 
an entirely separate contract will be seriously 
affected by the termination. Thus, although the 
setting aside of a lease would make impossible 
the performance of a contract between the lessee 
and another, it was held that the third person 
was only a proper party and could be joined or 
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not at the option of the plaintiff. Similarly, in a 
suit by A to declare its obligations under a con-
tract with B as terminated, C, whose obligations 
to B under another contract and who will be 
affected by the status of A's obligations, is not 
an indispensable party." 3A Moore,s Federal 
Practice 2349-50, para. 19.10 (1967). (Citing 
cases; emphasis added.) 
Since defendant, as an incidental beneficiary, has 
no legally enforceable interest in the covenant not to 
sue, it is apparent that it was not a necessary party to 
the action to reform the covenant. 
It should be pointed out, furthermore, that de-
f end ant took no action in reliance on the unreformed 
covenant which operated to its detriment and that no 
question of estoppel arises. Defendant is no worse off 
than if the covenant as originally executed had included 
the reservation. 
It is, therefore, the covenant as ref armed which 
determines the respective rights and obligations of the 
parties. 
II 
THE DECREE OF REFORMATION WAS VALID AND 
PROPER. 
Defendant attacks the validity of the decree of 
reformation on the ground that parol evidence is inad-
missable to vary the terms of a written instrument. 
It is a universally received rule of law, however, 
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that the parol evidence rule does not apply in cases of 
mutual mistake. 30 Am. fur. 2d 172, Evidence § 1037 
( 1967) : 
"Parol evidence to show such mutual mis-
take ... may be introduced in an action in equity 
to reform the written contract because of the 
mutual mistake." 
Thus, the fact that a release was entered into 
through mutual mistake may be shown by parol evi-
dence. Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th 
Cir. 1927). 
III 
A COVENANT NOT TO SUE AN AGENT WITH EX-
PRESS RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AGAINST THE COR-
PORATE PRINCIPAL DOES NOT RELEASE THE COR-
PORATE PRINCIPAL. 
Although it is widely held that a release of one 
joint tortfeasor releases all, 45 Am. fur. 699, Release § 35 
( 1943), it is well settled that a mere covenant not to 
sue has no such effect on those jointly liable, Ibid., § 4: 
"By the great weight of authority, a coven-
ant not to sue ... one joint tort-feasor is held not 
to amount to a release, and therefore such an 
agreement is held not to discharge the other joint 
... tort-feasors." pp. 676-77. 
Particularly is this so where there is an express reserva-
tion of rights against the other joint tort-feasor. 
By statute in Utah (the Uniform Joint Obligations 
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Act) it is provided that the release of one joint obligator 
"shall not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee 
in writing and as part of the some transaction as the 
release or discharge expressly reserves his rights ... " 
§ 15-4-4 U.C.A. ( Repl. vol. 1962). Although no Utah 
case has considered whether section 4 of the Uniform 
Obligations Act applies to covenants not to sue as well 
as releases, the Wisconsin courts have so decided on 
identical language. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Continental Gas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W. 2d 425 
( 1953). The Utah statute was held to apply to a cov-
enant not to sue in United States v. First Security Bank 
of Utah, 208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R. 2d 951 (10th Cir. 
1953). 
In light of the foregoing authorities it would seem 
obvious enough that the covenant not to sue executed 
in favor of defendant's agent, Gideon Allen, but expressly 
reserving plaintiff's rights aginst defendant is effective 
according to its terms. Defendant contends, however, 
that the above stated rules apply only in the case of 
joint tort-feasors, that its liability is merely secondary, 
arising solely by reason of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, and that a covenant not to sue one primarily 
liable does release one who is secondarily liable, not-
withstanding the reservation of rights against the one 
secondarily liable. 
Defendant's position, however, ( 1) misconceives the 
nature of a corporation's liability for the acts of its ag-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
ents, ( 2) is inconsistent with the better reasoned authori-
ties and ( 3) disregards principles of sound statutory 
construction. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah provides that 
"all corporations ... shall be subject to be sued, in all 
courts, in like cases as natural persons." Art. XII, § 4 
(Emphasis added.) A corporation is, however, an arti-
ficial person and can act only through its agents. If 
corporations are to be subject to suit "in all courts, in 
like cases as natural persons" it follows inexorably, from 
the language of the Constitution, that corporations must 
be held primarily liable for the acts of their agents. Hy-
pertechnical distinctions between the "primary" liability 
of an agent and the "secondary" liability of his principal 
supposed to result from the doctrine of respondeat super· 
ior are wholly inappropriate in the context of a corporate 
principal and its employee. If a corporation is only 
"secondarily" liable for the acts of its agents one may 
well ask, when is a corporation "primarily" liable? In-
deed, how then are corporations "subject to be sued 
... as natural persons"? The distinction is clearly intol-
erable both in logic and justice. 
For that reason, no doubt, the better reasoned cases 
give effect to the intention of him who, in executing a 
covenant not to sue an employee, expressly reserves his 
rights against the corporate principle. A leading case 
is Ellis v. Jewett Rhoades Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 
395, 84 P.2d 791 ( 1938), in which the corporate de-
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fcndant defended on the ground that a covenant not to 
sue its employee, whose negligence had caused plaintiff's 
in juries, released the corporate principle. The court ex-
pressly rejected the theory that the covenant not to sue 
the servant exonerated his master. 
Similarly, applying the Uniform Joint Obligations 
Act, a New York court in Wilson v. New York, 131 N.Y. 
Supp, 2d 47, held that a municipal corporation was 
liable for an assault by its police officer where the 
plaintiff had released the latter under an instrument 
expressly reserving rights against the municipality. 
Even in cases where the principal is a natural per-
son some courts have been reluctant to make artificial 
distinctions between "primary" liability of the agent and 
"secondary" liability of the principal. Thus in Boucher 
v. Thomsen, 328 Mich. 312, 43 N.W. 2d 866, 20 A.LR. 
2d 1038 ( 1950), the court held that the owner of an 
automobile might be liable for the negligence of a garage 
employee who was testing out the automobile although 
the plaintiff had agreed not to pursue his rights against 
the garage and its employee. The court recognized that 
the car owner might be entitled to reimbursement from 
the garage owner and his employee, but found that the 
express language of the covenant left no question as to 
the intention of the parties, and that their intention was 
controlling. 
And in Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, (Tex. Civ. 
App.), aff'd. 280 S.W. 546 (Tex. Com. App. 1925) the 
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court refused to recognize an attempted distinction be-
tween joint tort-feasors and master and servant, finding 
the distinction superficial. 
Although the Utah courts have never passed upon 
the precise issue raised by defendant, the question was 
answered on Utah law by the Tenth Circuit in United 
States v. First Security Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 424, 42 
A.LR. 2d 951 ( 10th Cir. 1953). This was an action 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for in-
juries sustained as a result of the negligence of the driver 
of a United States mail car. The plaintiffs executed 
covenants not to sue in favor of the mail carrier, ex-
pressly reserving their rights against the government. 
Holding that plaintiffs' action against the government 
was not barred by the covenant, the court reasoned as 
follows: 
"It is generally recognized ... that a covenant 
not to sue one or more tort-feasors with express 
reservation of the right to proceed against others 
does not bar an action against other joint tort-
feasors . . . While [a master and servant J may 
not be joint tort-feasors in the sense that their 
joint acts caused an injury, a majority of courts 
hold that their liability is joint and several and 
each is liable to the full extent of the injuries 
and they may be joined in an action in the same 
manner as joint tort-feasors. The law of joint 
tort-feasors relating to releases and covenants not 
to sue is applicable." 42 A.LR. 2d 958. (Em-
phasis added.) 
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These authorities accord with a fundamental policy 
of subordinating technical legal doctrine to the clearly 
expressed and understood intentions of the parties, a 
policy embodied in the Uniform Joint Obligations Act. 
Defendant's sophistries, to the effect that it might be 
able to recover over from its employee if under Utah 
law it is regarded as a surety, disregard sound principles 
of statutory construction. 
By statute in Utah legislation in derogation of the 
common law is to be liberally construed. Section 68-3-2 
U.C.A. (Repl. vol. 1968). One must consider, therefore, 
the policy of the statute. Considerable light is shed on 
that policy by the following comment at 73 A.LR. 2d 
407-408 ( 1960), criticizing the rule that the release of 
one joint tort-feasor releases all: 
"The rule has been vigorously attacked by law 
writers. It has been described as merely a 'sur-
viving relic of the Cokian period of metaphysics.' 
It tends to def eat the fair expectations and inten-
tions of the parties to the release. It may be 
noted that all but one of the Continental legal 
systems have flatly rejected the rule. . .. 
"The harshness of the original common-law 
rule has resulted in legislation abrogating the 
rule ..... such as the Uniform Joint Obligations 
Act ... . 
"In the absence of statutory regulation, the 
modern trend is toward a rule which abrogates 
the strict comon-law release rule and makes the 
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intention of the parties to a releast the test of 
its effect as a release of joint tort-feasors not 
t . th t ,, par ies ere o. . . . 
The Uniform Joint Obligations Act has been ad-
opted in Nevada, New York, Utah and Wisconsin. Only 
New York has considered the effect of Section 4 on a 
covenant not to sue an agent reserving rights against 
his principal, holding that the principal is not released 
thereby. Wilson v. New York, 131 N.Y. Supp. 2d 47; 
Wilson v. Econom, 288 N.Y. Supp. 2d 381, 56 Misc. 
2d 272. 
One could hardly imagine a case better calculated 
to illustrate the very evils against which the statute and 
the modem trend of decisions is directed than the present 
one. If ever there was a resort to "Cokian metaphysics" 
to "defeat the fair expectations and intentions of the 
parties" it is defendant's brief on appeal. 
The decision of the Court in this case will forge 
new law in the state of Utah. Plaintiff urges that the 
Court follow the modem trend of decisions, as exem-
plified by United States v. First Security Bank of Utah, 
208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R. 2d 951 (10th Cir. 1953), and 
give heed to the policy of the Uniform Joint Obligations 
Act. Defendant suffers nothing but, perhaps, the loss 
of an unearned advantage from the rule that a covenant 
not to sue an agent may reserve rights against a prin· 
cipal. A contrary holding would have the harshest of 
results for plaintiff. 
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IV 
EVEN WITHOUT AN EXPRESS RJESERVATION OF 
RIGHTS AGAINST THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL A 
COVENANT NOT TO SUE AN AGENT DOES NOT RE-
LEASE THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL. 
If the Court should decide that the decree of re-
formation is not binding on defendant, it is plaintiff's 
position that even without the reservation of plantiff's 
rights against defendant the covenant not to sue does 
not release defendant. 
As argued above, Point III: 
"By the great weight of authority, a coven-
ant not to sue ... one joint tort-feasor is held not 
to amount to a release, and therefore such an 
agreement is held not to discharge the other joint 
... tort-feasors." 45 Am. fur. 676-77, Release 
§ 4 ( 1943). 
To hold otherwise in this case the Court would have to 
employ the discredited distinction between "primary" 
and "secondary" liability of a corporation and its agents, 
respectively. For the reasons set forth in his argument 
under Point IIL above, plaintiff urges the Court not to 
do so. 
Valuable authority is found in the recent Nevada 
case, Whittlesea v. Farmer, 469 P.2d 57, (Nev. 1970), 
in which the court, observing the similarity between a 
covenant not to sue and a covenant not to execute, held 
ti .at a covenant not to execute in favor of one joint tort-
feasor did not relea'5e a second joint tort-feasor even 
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though plaintiff's rights against the latter were not ex-
pressly reserved. 
CONCLUSION 
The covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff in 
favor of defendant's employee was validly reformed to 
include an inadvertantly and mistakenly omitted reser-
vation of plaintiff's rights against defendant. By the 
better view, that reservation is effective according to the 
intent of the parties. Furthermore, defendant was aware 
of that intention and led plaintiff to believe that it would 
def end on the merits of the case. Even if it should be 
held that the reservation is invalid as against defendant, 
the modem view is that a covenant not to sue operates 
only in favor of the parties thereto and cannot be as-
serted by one who is jointly liable notwithstanding the 
absence of an express reservation of rights against him. 
Plaintiff requests that this case be returned to the 
district court for trial on the merits. 
-/-- ~J~b~ _ /, 
ckson Howard, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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